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According to recent estimations by the Brookings Institu-
tion, the Asia-Pacific region will account for two thirds 
of the world’s middle-class population by 2030. Although 
this will inevitably increase the influence of the Asian 
middle classes, growing numbers and power do not trans-
late into democratization in any straightforward manner. 
If modernization theorists were to be believed, the rise 
of the Asian middle classes would accelerate the West-
ernization of political systems and of tastes, values and 
lifestyles, as the emerging masses press for change in the 
form of greater freedom and influence. And yet, at pres-
ent Asia offers ample evidence to challenge these predic-
tions. A comparison between the level of democratization 
based on the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation 
Index (BTI) and the size of the middle class in selected 
Asian countries reveals that there is only a loose corre-
lation between the two variables (Figure 1). In relative 
terms, India’s middle-income population is tiny compared 
to Singapore’s, but democracy has fared much better in 
India than in the Southeast Asian city-state.
 In fact, conservative middle classes often use their 
numbers and political clout to prevent democratization 
from happening. Across the Asia-Pacific region sections 
of the middle classes are supporting anciens régimes. 
Asia watchers have been kept exceptionally busy by recent political developments 
in the region. An unprecedented landslide victory in India’s general elections, 
pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, close elections in Indonesia, a coup in 
Thailand – the list goes on. As unrelated as these events appear, analysts may 
find a missing link among a social group that is currently exploding in numbers: 
Asia’s middle classes. Often discussed simply in terms of its economic potential, 
Asia’s middle-income population is also flexing its political muscle. A closer look 
at its influence throughout the region in recent months seems to confirm for 
the field of politics what economists have known for some time: The rise of the 
Asian middle classes constitutes one of the most fundamental transformations 
of our time. The consequences remain to be seen.
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The Political Potential 
of China’s Middle Classes
In September 2014, Hong Kong’s so-called Umbrella Move-
ment started making international headlines. The protest-
ers, mainly university students, were demanding free 
elections of Hong Kong’s next Chief Executive in 2017 and 
thereby challenging a decision by Beijing’s central gov-
ernment to only allow a vote for preselected candidates. 
The demonstrations lasted several weeks and repeatedly 
turned violent when police tried to disperse the movement 
with tear gas (unsuccessfully, as the students hid behind 
umbrellas that became the symbol of their campaign) and 
groups of masked thugs attacked protest camps.
 The Umbrella Movement is Hong Kong’s strongest act 
of civil disobedience to date and enjoys support from a 
These can take the form of one-party states, unaccount-
able monarchies or autocracies whose leaders are elected 
on the basis of their religious credentials or order-gener-
ating capacities and who often represent the supposedly 
traditional Asian strongman. And yet other countries 
seem to support the assumption that the middle classes 
can indeed bring about political liberalization. To com-
plicate things, even within individual states the middle 
classes are often strongly diversified; rising and aspir-
ing, they are confronted with more established peers, 
who defend the fortunes they acquired in previous de-
velopment cycles against their new competitors. Recent 
examples from throughout the region highlight the com-
plex relationship between politics and Asia’s growing 
middle classes.
Figure 1: Democratization and Middle Class Size, 2012
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Note: The BTI uses fi ve criteria to measure a country’s democracy status: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic 
institutions, and political and social integration. The size of a bubble represents the size of a country’s population. 
Sources: Middle-class population (in percent): “Development, Aid and Governance Indicators (DAGI)”, Brookings Institution, 2012; Democracy status: BTI 2014, 
www.bti-project.org; Population data as of 2012: World Development Indicators of the World Bank; Taiwan: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.
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3to maintain stability at all costs is the core argument 
against democratic reforms of China’s system of govern-
ment. Members of mainland China’s middle class focus 
on a good career rather than political activism. Moreover, 
they worry about the education of their offspring, their 
own health insurance and pensions, as well as the care 
required by their parents. Despite the distinct prefer-
ence for stability and material desires, however, China’s 
middle class appears not to share common values or a 
collective identity and political attitude around which 
they could unite. Middle-class members display a broad 
variety of identities, lifestyles, occupations and family 
backgrounds. They may be managers in state-owned en-
terprises, university professors, cadres, or self-employed 
artists, or work for foreign-invested companies, which is 
why one could speak of Chinese middle classes rather 
than of a unified middle class. 
 In terms of their political affiliations, the middle 
classes are roughly divided into those who are “inside 
the system” (tizhinei) and those who are “outside the 
system” (tizhiwai), referring to government and non-gov-
ernment employees. Since the former and their careers 
are completely dependent on the regime, they tend to be 
more supportive of it than those who are formally out-
side the system. Also, “insiders” naturally are more hes-
itant to support political change. Due to the importance 
of personal networks (guanxi), however, even “outsid-
ers” often cannot and do not want to dodge the system’s 
influence entirely.
 But this is only one side of the coin. A growing part of 
China’s middle classes – not only outside, but more impor-
tantly also inside the system – is increasingly dissatisfied 
with everyday living conditions being spoiled by environ-
mental pollution, food scandals, omnipresent corruption 
and lax protection of individual rights. In recent years, 
Chinese civil society has gained more and more influence 
in regard to these issues. The internet and social media, 
such as the microblogging service Weibo, help them orga-
nize and get their message across. China has seen a surge 
majority of the city’s seven million residents, according to 
an opinion poll conducted by the Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University. Commentators were quick to draw connec-
tions to the 1989 democracy movement in Beijing’s Ti-
ananmen Square, which is omnipresent in any discussion 
of how China’s Communist Party deals with social unrest. 
While fears of a similar tragedy appeared unfounded and 
the movement did not pose any serious threat to the cen-
tral leadership, the protests did touch a sensitive spot: the 
question of how to handle a rapidly growing middle class 
with rising aspirations and demands, which is high on 
Beijing’s agenda.
 China’s state controlled media did their best to diffuse 
the Hong Kong demonstrations by framing the protesters 
as spoiled kids and troublemakers who were acting un-
der the influence of hostile foreign forces. In the absence 
of a free press or independent polling, public opinion in 
China is impossible to measure. But even if a majority of 
mainlanders follows the official spin, it is at least safe to 
say that a substantial number of Chinese privately sympa-
thize with calls for more public participation and checks 
on the power of the Communist Party.
 Nevertheless, Hong Kong can hardly serve as a test-
ing ground for how civil pressure for democratization 
could play out on the mainland. Whereas in Hong Kong 
the majority belongs to the middle class, it is difficult to 
quantify the middle class in mainland China. Estimations 
range from four to 25 percent of the total population or 
eight to 50 percent of the urban population. The number 
most commonly cited amounts to roughly 300 million 
people mainly located along the east coast. Mainland Chi-
na’s middle class is broadly defined by criteria of socio-
economic wellbeing, which is why the triad “apartment, 
car, money” has become a popular symbol of this social 
group in China. Since its members have experienced a 
dramatic improvement of living conditions in their life-
times, the majority holds a strong desire for social and 
political stability and a fear of a return to the chaotic 
conditions that predominated in the Mao era. The need 
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culminated in another military coup, while Indonesia 
held a peaceful presidential election, which nevertheless 
revealed a political rift in the country. In both states, po-
litical developments were affected not primarily by ten-
sions between the extreme ends of society, but within the 
growing middle of the societal hierarchy. 
 It may be odd to compare two seemingly disparate 
places like Thailand and Indonesia, the former being 
ruled by a bizarre and reactionary military junta and the 
latter by a democratically elected president who ran on a 
progressive ticket. In fact, in recent months analysts have 
started to hold up Indonesia as the new beacon of democ-
racy in the region, contrasting it with Thailand’s constant 
slide into the political abyss. It is easy to agree with such 
an analysis if one compares the rational and humble na-
ture of Indonesian president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo with 
the clumsy exploits of Thailand’s military dictator Pra-
yuth Chan-ocha. But this means forgetting how narrowly 
Indonesia escaped a return to its authoritarian past, the 
so-called New Order, in the presidential elections: Almost 
every second Indonesian voter risked a New Order re-
vival by supporting the controversial candidate Prabowo 
Subianto, who promised a firm dictatorial grip. And even 
though Prabowo was the losing candidate, parties back-
ing him still dominate the parliament and began an as-
sault on democracy in September by trying to scrap direct 
elections at the local level.
 In search of explanations for the polarization in both 
countries, it is important to look beyond a simple poor-
vs.-rich dichotomy. Media reports suggested that it was 
not primarily the poor and uneducated on the margins 
of Indonesian society who supported Prabowo – quite the 
opposite. In the weeks before the elections, Jokowi had to 
work particularly hard to woo the urban-based and sup-
posedly rationally minded middle class to secure his victo-
ry. While voters with only a primary-school level of educa-
tion were mostly backing Jokowi, those with a university 
degree and a monthly income of more than two million 
Indonesian rupiah (US$165) had been shifting their sup-
in protests, which were triggered and reinforced by these 
new means of communication that are especially popular 
with members of the middle class. China’s new leadership 
headed by Xi Jinping takes the threat of too much freedom 
of communication seriously and has once more tightened 
the state’s already iron grip on the internet. Nevertheless, 
there is an explosive social vigor in China which ought not 
to be underestimated. It is not only China’s middle classes 
that are divided, but the country itself – between rural and 
urban areas, the developed east and a developing west, 
rich and poor, the latter clearly seen in the alarming in-
crease of the Gini coefficient from 0.2 in 1988 to 0.47 in 
2013 – with its middle classes literally in the middle of 
it. Even though this heterogeneous social group currently 
may not be deemed a unified driver of political change, its 
members will continuously strengthen their political par-
ticipation through various formal and informal channels.
The Tyranny of the Old Middle: How Mid-
dle Class Reactionaries are Bullying New 
‘Classmates’ in Thailand and Indonesia 
In Southeast Asia, as in China, the term middle class 
should be used in the plural, i.e. middle classes, to reflect 
their internal diversity. This diversity goes a long way 
toward explaining not just the class dynamics of South-
east Asian societies but the rocky political paths that 
some countries in the region have recently taken. Devel-
opments in 2014 have made it impossible to ignore that 
democracy in Southeast Asia has faced setbacks, raising 
concerns of a sustained democratic rollback in the region. 
Incremental but fragile progress in countries such as 
Myanmar and the Philippines notwithstanding, clashes 
over conflicting interests and political influence have 
caused societies to drift apart. Consensus on how to orga-
nize the state has broken down in various places. A closer 
look at the middle classes in Thailand and Indonesia is 
crucial to understanding why.
 2014 was a decisive year for both nations. Thailand 
experienced yet another wave of violent protests, which 
5the Old Middle that Jokowi and other democrats in South-
east Asia have to convince of the need for greater solidar-
ity and democratic governance.
The ‘Great Indian Middle Class’ 
at the Crossroads
The results of India’s 2014 general elections came as a 
surprise to many. It was not so much the fact that the 
Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) and its charismatic leader Na-
rendra Modi carried the day that astonished observers, 
but the decisiveness of the mandate, reflecting the enor-
mity of anti-incumbency feelings among the electorate. 
It was largely a result fuelled by the Indian middle class’s 
anger over the “business as usual” attidude of the coun-
try’s political class. This suggests that the Indian middle 
class is gradually becoming a player of importance as it 
embraces an ethos of “change” that many would see as 
commensurate with its size and societal role.
 For a long time after liberalization had unleashed an 
unprecedented dynamism of the Indian economy, writ-
ings on the Indian middle class were either concerned 
with its apolitical and introspective nature, or they were 
corporate-driven and, usually, far too optimistic about an 
ever-growing consumer market. It looks as if this percep-
tion of the country’s middle class has changed in the last 
couple of years. From Anna Hazare’s campaign against 
corruption to the activism surrounding the Dec. 16, 2012, 
rape case and, most recently, the 2014 general elections, 
the middle class seems to have realized its potential as a 
game changer addressing key issues, such as the unequal 
distribution of power, policy paralysis, and corruption. Is 
the Indian middle class thus finally increasing its power 
through democracy and by embracing a distinctively po-
litical and participatory agenda – as modernization theo-
ry would predict?
 Definitions of what constitutes this new Indian middle 
class and estimates of its size vary widely. One yardstick 
is qualitative criteria based less on the middle class as 
an empirical reality, and more as a conceptual category. 
port to Prabowo. It was their nostalgia, their longing 
for the good old days of effective authoritarianism, and 
their disenchantment with a corruption-prone democracy 
that almost led to Indonesia’s democratic demise. Anti-
democratic protests in Thailand were likewise driven 
by an urban-based middle class with fond memories of 
a time when Thai generals ruled the kingdom in tan-
dem with the monarchy. Democratic support, in contrast, 
seemed to come from members of the emerging lower 
middle class in the provinces.
 The historic trajectory of Southeast Asia is key here. 
In the second half of the 20th century, developmental re-
gimes throughout the region fostered the emergence of a 
middle class that owed its existence to these authoritarian 
states. Middle-class identities were not shaped in a demo-
cratic setting or in resistance to government interference, 
but in the context of a symbiotic relationship with it. Only 
when this arrangement started to fail, particularly in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, when the frailty 
of technocratic efficiency and top-down development be-
came obvious, did the middle class help overthrow authori-
tarianism. But as the region’s economies expanded again 
and captured people at the margins, a new and aspiring 
middle class stirred suspicions among the established 
one, with its sentimental ties to the old developmental 
regimes. While the newcomers considered democracy a 
useful tool to secure for themselves a slice of the national 
cake, the established middle class – relatively small in 
numbers and therefore insecure – grew more defensive. 
Its members had simply not learned how to share. These 
middle-class reactionaries began again to support au-
thoritarians like the royalist generals in Thailand and the 
New Order lackey Prabowo in Indonesia, thereby revers-
ing, or endangering, democratic progress and the mate-
rial improvement of their new fellow class members. The 
“Tyranny of the Old Middle” has succeeded in destroying 
democratic institutions in Thailand. Indonesians averted 
this fate for now by electing Jokowi, although his winning 
margin was, as already noted, far from impressive. It is 
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private sector, having a stronger entrepreneurial spirit 
and greater economic independence. 
 What, then, is the middle class’s agenda? Until very 
recently, protecting their own material interests and so-
cial privileges more or less epitomized the ethos of the 
members of the new Indian middle class. There are now 
signs that the middle class is beginning to act as a class 
that engages in collective action, making new political 
demands and holding potentially more progressive views 
on issues like corruption, government accountability and 
inequality. Before the Hazare movement gained momen-
tum, middle-class engagement largely played out in the 
realm of “new politics,” outside the electoral arena. Disil-
lusioned with the “dirty” business of politics, the middle 
class turned to other avenues in order to enter local gover-
nance structures, such as Resident Welfare Associations 
or Advanced Locality Management Groups. The street 
protests and media frenzy during the Hazare movement 
and, especially, the subsequent formation of the Aam 
The most striking feature, which the Indian middle class 
shares with the middle classes in other Asian countries, 
is its extraordinary internal diversity. Divisions are nu-
merous and include caste, region, occupation, income, 
community, etc. Nevertheless, the most powerful sub-
group of the Indian middle class is becoming more and 
more homogenized, ideologically speaking. It is a genu-
ine “class,” and its influence goes beyond the numbers, 
not least due to the use of modern technology such as 
social media. This dominant subgroup is largely made 
up of prosperous, white-collar, young and mostly upper-
caste Hindus in the metropolitan areas, as opposed to 
the much less vociferous lower middle classes in small 
cities and rural areas. In terms of income and visibility, 
the dominant Indian middle class is therefore primarily 
an urban phenomenon. Contrary to its pre-liberalization 
predecessor, which was centered around the public sector 
and consisted overwhelmingly of civil servants, today’s 
post-liberalization middle class is tightly wedded to the 
East Asia and Pacifi c
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Figure 2: Middle Classes: Estimation and Forecasts
2 23 68 1 9 81 4 19 73 21 42 854 23 68
 2000      2014      2030
Note: The middle class includes people earning or spending US$10 – 100 a day (2005 purchasing power parity).
Source: “Development, Aid and Governance Indicators (DAGI)”, Brookings Institution, 2012.
7Asian states have been incredibly apt at providing devel-
opment in the form of “bread and circuses” by catering 
to the material demands of their citizens. In some places, 
an already established middle class has even sought to 
disenfranchise a new and rising middle class, which the 
old guard considers an annoying competitor. As long as 
members of the dominant middle class feel that their im-
mediate interests are served by defending the status quo, 
there seems to be no need for them to change the rules of 
the political game.
 However, it is too soon to write off the Asian middle 
classes as agents of political change. It is easy to forget 
that their counterparts in the West have also not always 
been, and still are not, the sole source of enlightened 
progress. Observers of sections of the middle class in Eu-
rope’s interwar period – of Germany’s Mittelstand in the 
1930s, say – would have been hard pressed to ascribe a 
reformist role to them. An analysis of class is always cul-
turally and historically contingent. And as cultures and 
times change, so does the outlook of the middle classes. 
Compare, for example, middle-class demands in Taiwan 
or Hong Kong with those in mainland China, and all talk 
of Chinese exceptionalism, of an unchanging Chinese 
psyche that stands in the way of democracy, should fade 
away. If anger over corruption spreads, if economic devel-
opment slows due to cronyism and inefficiency, if markets 
dive because of a dismal global outlook, if criticism can 
no longer be suppressed, and if the deliberate fuelling of 
nationalism fails to distract from domestic problems, the 
Asian middle classes may in time also demand less pa-
ternalism and a more direct say in the running of their 
countries. This would not merely be the result of West-
ernization. It would be a natural response to the failure 
of the state to serve its citizens. But these are many ifs. It 
remains to be seen whether modernization theorists will 
have the final say in Asia.
Admi Party marked a departure from the earlier rather 
apolitical and introspective engagement.
 However, is this really the advent of a long-term demo-
cratic force, and not just a generally more pragmatic and 
instrumental support of democracy? Is it really an en-
gagement that reflects more progressive values geared 
towards – inter alia – transcending caste identities, de-
veloping a stronger focus on the common good and shed-
ding the traditional “strongman proclivity” prevalent in 
Indian society? The lower middle class, still vulnerable to 
economic shocks, tends to maintain its rather pragmatic 
outlook on democracy and remains riddled with identity 
politics. The dominant, more prosperous and urban mid-
dle class – which on more than one occasion was able to 
impose its demands in the political debate, drawing at-
tention to issues such as corruption, the role of women 
in society and improving access to infrastructure, such 
as roads, water or electricity – may therefore be more ca-
pable of political engagement as a corrective force. But it, 
too, lacks patience with the muddled ways of democracy, 
displays a proclivity towards Hindu nationalism as a re-
action to the rise of political parties representing lower 
castes, and seems to prefer efficiency (or the one who 
promises to provide it) over genuine political participa-
tion. The real test as to whether the Indian middle class 
will act as a driver of political change is yet to come. 
The Way ahead for the 
Asian Middle Classes 
Although indicators and forecasts vary, the expansion 
of the Asian middle classes will become one of the de-
fining features of global development, if projections are 
anything to go by (Figure 2). However, developments over 
the past year in China, Southeast Asia and India seem to 
underline a simple fact: Expectations of a straightforward 
democratization brought about by the growing middle 
classes in Asia are misplaced. The presence of a substan-
tial middle class does not automatically correspond to an 
acceleration of democratization – quite the reverse. Some 
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